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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently a group of cases brought in the Southern District of
New York have raised questions as to securities analysts' liability
for harms resulting from the recommendations they offer.' These
cases have further suggested that the firms the analysts represent
would also be implicated when the stocks touted are ultimately
valued at a small fraction of their value at the time the
recommendation to buy was issued Thomson v. Morgan Stanley
J.D. candidate 2002, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Pludo v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7072,
2001 WL 958922 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter &
Co., No. 01-CIV-7071, 2001 WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Senders v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7621, 2001 WL 958927 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Soto v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7072, 2001 WL 958922
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Stein v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7262,
2001 WL 958936 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lloyd v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,
No. 01- CIV-7263, 2001 WL 959190 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Williams v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7500, 2001 WL 964010 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Malvan
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7248, 2001 WL 965294
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). For the sake of expediency and ease of reference, the Thomson
complaint will be used throughout this Comment to reference Judge Pollack's
dismissal of these cases. See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
2 See Complaint at 5, Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No.
01-CIV-7071, 2001 WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating the claim that Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter is culpable due to the conflicts existing between its research
and analysts departments and its investment banking business).
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Dean Witter & Co. and Mary Meeker' and other nearly identical
cases brought against these defendants4 sent shockwaves through
the brokerage houses of Wall Street by raising the possibility that
analysts could be held accountable for the millions of dollars lost in
the wake of recent market tumbles.'
Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest the huge
losses suffered as a result of the recent technology and Internet
stock phenomenon were not the result of mistake, negligence or
incompetence (or even merely bad luck), but collusive market
strategy designed to cull favor with clients of the investment houses
paying the analysts' salaries.6 Though each of the recent spate of
cases was dismissed because of "gross and unrestrained"
3. Thomson, 2001 WL 958925.
4. Pludo, 2001 WL 958922; Thomson, 2001 WL 958925; Senders, 2001 WL
958927; Soto, 2001 WL 958922; Stein, 2001 WL 958936; Lloyd, 2001 WL 959190
are the six "companion cases" referenced by Judge Pollack in his dismissal order,
but Williams, 2001 WL 964010, and Malvan, 2001 WL 965294, are virtually
identical as well - "The Complaint filed herein is a virtual word for word copy
of the complaint filed a few days earlier in Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co., et al. ... [t]he Complaint herein is dismissed for the same
reasons.". Williams, 2001 WL 964010 at *1; Malvan, 2001 WL 965294 at *1. All
eight were dismissed on August 21, 2001. Pludo, 2001 WL 958922, at *1;
Thomson, 2001 WL 958925, at *1; Senders, 2001 WL 958927, at *1; Soto, 2001 WL
958922, at *1; Stein, 2001 WL 958936, at *1; Lloyd, 2001 WL 959190, at *1;
Williams, 2001 WL 964010, at *1; Malvan, 2001 WL 965294, at *1. For ease of
reference, this Comment will focus on the Complaint and dismissal of Thomson,
2001 WL 958925.
5. See Andres Rueda, The Hot IPO Phenomenon and the Great Internet
Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21,57 n240 (2001); Amy Johnson, Sue Your
Broker, Bus. 2.0 (Oct. 2001) available at
http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/0,1640,16921,00.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2002).
6. Id. Rueda quotes several sources that considered analysts during the
"dot-coin boom" "nothing more than glorified sales people for their firms'
offerings," and cites an alarming statistic: "investors who followed the advice of
analysts employed by investment banks that underwrote the recommended
stocks lost an average of 52% of their investments." Id. 57. This statistic seems
to suggest that the enthusiastic buy recommendations were based more on the
relationship the company had with the firm employing the analyst than any
objective analysis of the potential performance of its stock.
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improprieties contained within the complaints,7 whether this was a
result of the improper pleadings or the underlying theories is
unclear. The two may be so inextricably linked as to preclude any
further actions based on theories of analyst/firm liability. If a court
were to find the elements of securities fraud could be established
based on an analyst's faulty opinion, the awards from such suits
could reach billions of dollars.8
The co-defendants in the cases were Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter and Morgan Stanley analyst Mary Meeker. Meeker and her
colleague, Merrill Lynch analyst Henry Blodget, were considered
more than mere industry experts - they were the media stars of the
Internet Age.9 While the Meeker suits were not refiled within the
requisite thirty day period, one of Blodget's recommendations
resulted in a suit that was ultimately settled." The Meeker cases
warrant further analysis as to the future of securities fraud claims
based on theories of analyst liability.
The allegations of securities fraud contained within the several
complaints stemmed from Meeker's dual role, as both investment
banker who courted companies to do business with Morgan
Stanley, and as analyst, who recommended buying or selling stocks,
7. See, e.g., Thomson., 2001 WL 958925, at *2. The cases were dismissed
with leave to refile on August 21, 2001, but none were refiled.
8. Rueda, supra note 5, at 21 (estimating the amounts lost during the
"speculative bubble" that was the Internet and technology stock market
phenomenon); see also Andy Kessler, We're All Analysts Now, WALL ST. J., July
30, 2001 (estimating that "[p]aying back the $500 billion loss of market cap in
Cisco alone would wipe out Wall Street's capital, as virtually every firm
recommended that stock.").
9. See Simon Goodley, End of An Era As Blodget Walks, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 20, 2001 at 30; see also Tina Marie O'Neill, Dotcom
Anger Turns on Analysts, SUNDAY Bus. POST, Oct. 21, 2001; Rueda, supra note 5,
at 57 n240 (quoting a FORTUNE MAGAZINE article that proclaims Meeker "'the
unquestioned diva of the Internet Age"' (citation omitted)).
10. Blodget had touted an Internet company that was about to be purchased
by one of Merrill Lynch's investment banking clients. O'Neill, supra note 9.
Plaintiff alleged that Blodget's recommendation clearly benefited the firm and its
investment banking business, and the subsequent worthlessness of the stock was
a result of its being overvalued by Blodget for the purpose of bolstering the
company's value prior to its sale. Id. Merrill Lynch settled the investor's $500,000
claim for $400,000. Id.
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sometimes of those very same companies." Specifically mentioned
in the Thomson complaint, which will be used as an example
throughout this Comment, is Amazon.com, a company whose stock
was recommended early in the company's history by Meeker.
Amazon.com eventually became a lucrative Morgan Stanley
investment banking client.'2
Presiding Judge Milton Pollack of the Southern District
chastised the plaintiffs for the excessive length of the complaint,"
and the "improprieties" contained therein; specifically, that the
complaint contained several colloquial phrases and references to
the role the media played in the alleged improprieties leading to
plaintiffs' losses." Judge Pollack seemed particularly chagrined by
the references to the analysts' lifestyles and remuneration and the
Wall Street culture itself." Notably, the dismissal was initiated by
the Court and had not been requested by defendants Morgan
Stanley and Mary Meeker, who stated they would not pursue
punitive measures against plaintiffs or their attorneys.'6 That Judge
Pollack dismissed the cases on the lack of particularity of the
claims in and the length of the pleadings meant the decision never
reached the question of whether the allegations raised in the
11. The complaint filed in Thomson alleges "materially false and misleading
statements which were designed to and did artificially inflate the price of
Amazon common stock." Complaint at 5, Thomson, 2001 WL 958925. Further,
the complaint alleged that Meeker made recommendations with a motive to
influence Morgan Stanley's investment banking business, thereby increasing her
own profit-based salary, particularly in the case of Amazon. Id. at 9. The
Thomson complaint is used as an example throughout this Comment.
12. Id.
13. Judge Pollack cites Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
chastising plaintiffs for the length and convoluted nature of the complaint, which
he admonished, should not be used as "a vehicle in which to air and put in issue
the views of newspapers, magazines, and social engineers, and their conclusions."
Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7071, 2001 WL
958925 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
14. Judge Pollack called the complaints "a rhetorical exercise in length and
forensic embroidery," as well as "hopelessly redundant, argumentative and
[containing] much irrelevancy and inflammatory material." Id at *1.
15. Id.
16. Notebook, CONSUMER ELECrRONICS, Oct. 22, 2001 (available on file with
the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).
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complaint warranted further inquiry - whether the prevailing
industry practice of analysts as investment bankers creates a strong
inference of motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud.'7
II. THE HEIGHTENED REQUIREMENT UNDER THE PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
Though Judge Pollack found the pleadings in these cases
inadequate under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA"),' 8 the form of pleading may not be all that stood
between plaintiffs and their quest for relief. Under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10(b)(5),' a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant made a misstatement
or omission of a material fact, reliance on which was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's harm, and that the statement or omission was
made with scienter, or the requisite intent.
In Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.,2 the Second
Circuit held that in order to establish the element of scienter'
necessary to sustain a cause of action for securities fraud, "a
plaintiff must either (a) allege facts to show that defendants had
both motive and opportunity to commit fraud or (b) allege facts
that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness."'  The PSLRA moved the threshold
for scienter to the pleading stage, where the plaintiff must "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind" in order to
17. For a discussion of the requirements to sustain a cause of action based on
securities fraud, see infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
18. 15. U.S.C. § 78u-(4) (2000) (demanding that instances of securities fraud,
along with the requisite guilty state of mind, or scienter, be pled with
particularity); see also infra notes 20-24 (discussing scienter and particularity
requirements).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
21. Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 163 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
22. "[I]ntent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or knowing misconduct." Id.
at 538 (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1467 (2d Cir. 1996)).
23. Press, 163 F.3d at 538.
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sustain a cause of action for securities fraud.4
Separate and apart from the issue of particularity, it is difficult,
though not impossible, for a plaintiff to establish the requisite
strong showing of motive and opportunity in the case of an
analyst's misstatements and/or omissions.' A major obstacle lies in
proving that an analyst's statement of opinion was motivated by
fraudulent intent.26 The potential conflicts of interest that existed
between Mary Meeker and Morgan Stanley and the need, real or
perceived, for the analyst to avoid disrupting the business of the
investment bank, 7 could have served as a source for the requisite
24. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000)); see also Beck v. Mfgs.
Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987)) (first outlining the Second Circuit
standard for scienter based on 10-b and 10b-5 actions). The Second Circuit
standard was articulated prior to the Private Securities Litigation Act, but the
Court has continued to apply the motive and opportunity test at the pleading
stage - a test established before the PSLRA was promulgated - finding nothing
in the PSLRA or its legislative history to preclude such an interpretation. See
Janine C. Guido, Seeking Enlightenment From Above: Circuit Courts Split on the
Interpretation of the Reform Act's Heightened Pleading Requirement, 66 BROOK.
L REv. 501, 514 (2000) (noting that the Second Circuit has held that its "motive
and opportunity or recklessness standard still satisfies the Reform Act's
heightened pleading requirement, and the SEC agrees."). Judge Pollack himself
reiterated this heightened standard in Liberty Ridge LLC v. RealTech Systems
Corp. and outlined the reasoning behind it: "Heightened pleading requirement
for allegations of fraud in securities litigation serves a threefold purpose: first, to
provide defendant with fair notice of plaintiff's claim, to enable him to prepare a
defense; second, to protect defendant from harm to his reputation or goodwill;
and, third, to reduce the number of strike suits." Liberty Ridge LLC v. RealTech
Sys. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
25. In fact, Merrill Lynch was sufficiently threatened by an allegation of
collusion and fraud made by a disgruntled investor to settle while the arbitration
was still pending. O'Neill, supra note 9; see also supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
26. Per Jebsen, Analysts Can Breathe Easier After Meeker Ruling, INDUS.
STANDARD, Aug. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.thestandard.com/wire/0,2231,27888,00.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
The author quotes Professor John Coffee of Columbia University School of Law,
who illustrates the uphill battle in proving fraudulent intent in matters of opinion.
Id.
27. Despite the ubiquitous Chinese Wall between analysts and investment
bankers at brokerage houses and the guarantees of objectivity dictated by both
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motive component,' although Judge Pollack clearly took issue with
the sources from which this information was gleaned. 9 But a
plaintiff alleging fraud against an analyst would have to
demonstrate that analyst's opinions were somehow different from
the prevailing views?0 In other words, if an analyst overrated a
stock in order to positively influence his or her firm's investment
banking business, then what would be the motive of other analysts,
unconnected to the investment banking activities of that company,
who issued buy recommendations for those same stocks? The fact
that during December of 2000, "sell" recommendations equaled
less than 2% of analysts' recommendations3' indicates that over-
enthusiasm and overvaluation were contagious and pervasive, and
therefore extremely difficult to blame on any particular
underwriting relationship with the particularity necessary to
successfully plead securities fraud past the complaint stage.
Further, demonstrating the opportunity component of the
scienter element would seem to require facts that constitute a
firm policies and industry regulations, an analyst who makes a conservative sell
recommendation that ultimately impacts the financial stability and value of a
company doing business with that firm must necessarily suffer for his or her
caution. See Kessler, supra note 8 (who recalls his experiences as an analyst, and
the consequences of making an overly-conservative recommendation); see also
Rueda, supra note 5, at 56-57; infra note 50 and accompanying text.
28. See Rueda, supra note 5, at 56-57 (illustrating the inherent conflicts in the
analyst/investment banker relationship and the potential for abuse).
29. The complaints heavily quoted media descriptions of Meeker, her
influence, and her compensation - estimated at $15 million by some accounts. See
e.g., Complaint at 3-4, Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-
CIV-7071, 2001 WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Rueda, supra note 5, at 57
n.240. The repeated use of such sources was described by Judge Pollack as "gross
and unrestrained" impropriet[y]. Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter &
Co., No. 01-CIV-7071, 2001 WL 958925, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
30. See Jebsen, supra note 26.
31. Rueda, supra note 5, at 72); Analyzing The Analysts: Are Investors
Getting Unbiased Research From Wall Street?: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises
of the House Committee on Financial Services, 107'h Cong. (June 14, 2001)
(opening statement of Full Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley) ("I am
distressed by the statistic that, as the markets were crashing last year, less than
2% of analyst recommendations were to sell.").
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strong showing that those investing to their detriment were
influenced solely by the analyst - that the recommendations alone
held sway over investors to such an extent that they served as the
primary source for those making such investment decisions - and
that the analyst therefore had the opportunity to effect market
changes by issuing recommendations. 2 As indicated above, the
pervasiveness of industry analysts and the glut of market
information during the Internet boom makes this very difficult to
demonstrate.
Plaintiffs in the Morgan Stanley Cases attempted to do just
that, with extensive quotations from Congressmen33 and newspaper
and magazine articles' intended to demonstrate the considerable
influence Meeker wielded over the investment choices of the
masses, as well as the concern with which commentators and the
media viewed the apparent conflicts of interest in her relationship
with Morgan Stanley.35 But it was precisely the commentators
quoted, as well as the prolific use of media sources, that prompted
Judge Pollack's ire.36 This seriously calls into question the ability of
32. Larry Dignan, Want to Sue Over Bad Stock Advice? You're Not Alone,
CNET INVESTOR, Aug. 20, 2001 (quoting Professor Coffee, who described the
"big hurdle" faced by the plaintiffs in these cases in proving Meeker's influence
over the masses).
33. See e.g., Complaint at 2, Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,
No. 01-CIV-7071, 2001 WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting for nearly an entire
page the opening remarks of Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski at the hearings
entitled "Analyzing the Analysts: Are Investors Getting Unbiased Research
From Wall Street?") (citation omitted).
34. See e.g., id. at 1 (quoting a FORTUNE MAGAZINE article). Newspaper and
magazine quotes appear frequently throughout, and large portions of the articles
are quoted. See e.g., , Complaint at 2-5, Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7071, 2001 WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting for
nearly 4 pages a NEW YORK TIMES article), at 20 (quoting a FORTUNE
MAGAZINE article), at 21, 23 (quoting THE STREET.COM articles), and numerous
other references to media publications.
35. See e.g., id.
36. "Almost all of the complaint is an unrestrained litany of and puts in issue
the selected speeches of social engineering politicians and articles, reports or
news items from FORTUNE MAGAZINE; THE NEW YORK TIMES; THE NEWS
TRIBUNE OF TACOMA, WASHINGTON; AFX NEWS; THESTREET.COM; THE
NATIONAL POST; SUNDAY BUSINESS; the SEATTLE POST- INTELLIGENCER; THE
2001] ANALYST LIABILITY AND THE INTERNET
any plaintiff to plead with particularity that an analyst had the
opportunity to commit fraud without using media sources to
demonstrate the analyst's widespread influence.
III. WHY A HEIGHTENED REQUIREMENT?
The Private Securities Litigation Act was promulgated in
19953' in large part to preclude frivolous lawsuits brought by
disgruntled investors not satisfied with the regulatory mechanisms
for dealing with disputes. Congress had not provided for a civil
suit remedy when enacting the legislation governing securities
fraud.39 Nevertheless, private causes of action under Section 10(b)'
and Rule 10(b)(5)"' have been accepted by the courts, which
therefore enjoy a certain degree of leeway in interpreting the
requirements for a finding of securities fraud.'2 The intent, or
scienter prong of a claim of securities fraud has been interpreted in
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE; the SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON; THE NEW YORK
POST; the NEW YORK OBSERVER; the cover of BARRON'S; 60 Minutes H; THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT; THE INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST; THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL; the Los ANGELES TIMES; and the CHICAGO TRIBUNE." Judge Milton
Pollack, Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7071, 2001
WL 958925, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
37. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) et seq.
(2000).
38. The chief aim of the PSLRA was to expedite dismissals of frivolous suits
at the pleading stage and prior to discovery, to preclude plaintiffs from extracting
large settlements from firms anxious to avoid the disclosure/discovery process,
and to minimize the expenses involved with a lawsuit that has progressed to that
stage. Guido, supra note 24. Professor Henry T.C. Hu points out the cost/benefit
analysis conducted by attorneys when bringing such suits, noting that the
preparation and due diligence costs of preparing a more particularized complaint
are much higher, and temper an attorney's willingness to litigate. Jebsen, supra
note 26.
39. However, rather than object to such suits, the SEC in fact welcomes
private civil litigation as a supplement to its own enforcement activities. Guido,
supra note 24, at 501.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
42. Guido, supra note 24, at 504.
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a number of ways, resulting in a lack of uniformity that the PSLRA
was designed to remedy.
Unfortunately, the PSLRA failed to provide the clarity
necessary to foster a uniform standard for scienter.43 Post-PSLRA,
circuit courts have split in interpreting the scienter element, but the
Second Circuit has remained consistent in its requirement that,
absent a strong showing of conscious misbehavior, motive and
opportunity must be pled under a heightened standard at the
pleading stage.44
IV. THE INVESTOR: A HAPLESS VIcTIM?
Shareholders can traditionally minimize risk by remaining
informed about the financial picture of the companies in which
they invest and by diversifying their investments. 4 The recent dot-
com boom made the former inconsequential and the latter
unwise. ' With the market focused on technology and Internet
companies, some investors assumed diversification could be
achieved by investing in several of these concerns. Further, the
need to diversify was seriously outweighed by the desire for the
considerable returns being achieved in those industries during the
height of the dot-com boom.47  Cross-industry diversification
43. Id. at 502 (discussing the confusion created by the PSLRA and the
resulting lack of agreement among the circuits as to what constitutes scienter
sufficient for a securities fraud claim to survive the pleading stage).
44. Id. at 509 (though Guido asserts that the Second Circuit has interpreted
its own scienter requirement in an increasingly lenient fashion with regards to
motive and opportunity).
45. "One of the major lessons of modem portfolio theory is that risk-averse
investors should diversify in order to eliminate their exposure to unique risk."
Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and
Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 175, 176 (Nov. 2000).
46. "[A] 2% dividend [does not] seem worth much attention when investors
could double their money in a few years or less ...... Ruth Simon & Jeff D.
Opdyke, Nasdaq's Big Lesson for Investors is That Diversification Still Matters:
Internet Bubble's Blowout Reminds Shareholders to Spread Out Risk by
Broadening Their Portfolios, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2001, at R1.
47. "Who needed to think about having a well-balanced portfolio when the
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seemed too conservative, even foolish, when the returns on
Internet company stocks were exceeding 1600%.'
Responsible investors can satisfy their duty or desire to
investigate the companies in which they invest by relying on
analysts. Analysts are in the best position to understand a
company's performance and have the information necessary to do
so." Further, analysts are trained and educated to know more
about markets and economics in general, and, more importantly,
about the specific industries they cover, than the average investor.
Investors therefore cannot be held wholly to blame for blindly
placing their trust and finances behind one whose role and
profession consists of interpreting the financial health of a
company and recommending whether its stock should be bought or
sold.
Or can they? Judge Pollack's analogizing the stock market to
a gambling pit is most accurate when applied to the recent dot-com
phenomenon. Those cautioning that technology and Internet stock
values were severely over-inflated and doomed to crash were
deemed nay-sayers and their warnings went unheeded.' It is fair to
Nasdaq Composite Index was up a remarkable 795% during the 1990's?" Id.
48. For example, Amazon.com shares, once trading at $24 per share, soared
to $400 per share before dropping to $9 per share in late November 2001.
Goodley, supra note 9, at 30.
49. The Supreme Court reiterated the importance with which the SEC
viewed the role and expertise of analysts in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659
(1983). "The SEC expressly recognized that '[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly
enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the
analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors."' Id. (citation omitted).
However, Regulation FD significantly undermined the premise that an analyst's
receipt of market information before it became public was necessary for a
healthy market by expressly prohibiting this practice. See SEC Regulation FD,
17 C.F.R. 243.100-103 (2001).
50. Henry Blodget, once considered an industry "superstar," came to
prominence in 1998 when he predicted that Amazon.com's share price would rise
from $240 to $400. Goodley, supra note 9, at 30. Jonathan Cohen, Internet
analyst at Merrill Lynch, was more conservative with his predictions, and
cautioned the stock's price could fall as much as $190, to $50 per share. Id.
Though Blodget's prediction was met with skepticism and ridicule, when
Amazon.com's price did in fact jump to $400, he replaced Cohen as Internet
245
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say that, when the media has widely reported that a company such
as Amazon has "never turned a profit,"'" and investors continued
to buy its stock at $300 and higher per share,52 the investor must
know that the buy is a gamble. Gambling is exactly the point.
Many investors in the dot-corn boom were trying to make
exponential returns in a short time - the proverbial "get-rich
quick" scheme. Once the market went sour, the lack of cross-
industry diversification resulted in stunning losses to many, who
then looked to the analysts for accountability. s
V. OTHER THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Whether or not analyst liability suits can prevail, or even
survive a dismissal motion, the investment banking and
underwriting practices of Wall Street's investment houses will not
escape further scrutiny. In addition to heightened regulatory and
Congressional attention,5" a large class-action suit based on an
antitrust theory is currently pending in the Southern District"5
which, if successful, promises to throw an even brighter spotlight
onto these practices.
Additionally, analysts could conceivably be held liable under a
analyst for Merrill Lynch. Id.
51. Rueda, supra note 5, at 73. In fact, Amazon was losing ninety cents per
share at the time it was trading near the $300 mark. Id.
52. Id. Amazon.com's share price eventually rose to $400. Goodley, supra
note 9, at 30.
53. See Rueda, supra note 5, at 26.
54. See, e.g., Analyzing The Analysts: Are Investors Getting Unbiased
Research From Wall Street?: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the House
Committee on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (June 14, 2001) (opening statement
of ranking democratic member Paul E. Kanjorski); Patty Reinert, Senate to
Subpoena Enron Execs, Auditors, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 3, 2001; Margaret
Kane, Analyst Hearing Could Change Wall Street, CNET NEWS.COM, June 15,
2001; Rachel Konrad & Margaret Kane, Congress Getting Into Analyst Blame
Game, CNET NEWS.COM, June 11, 2001.
55. See Complaint, In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., No. 01-CIV-
2014 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 2, 2002) (alleging that several large brokerage houses
engaged in a price-fixing scheme when setting up their underwriting selling group
and participation agreements, in violation of antitrust laws).
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theory of insider trading. Prior to Regulation FD,56 analysts were
privy to a company's financial performance data well before the
information was made public; such information formed the
analysts' recommendation to buy, sell, or hold that company's
stock.' Under Dirks v. SEC,8 in order for an individual to be
found guilty of insider trading for disclosing material, non-public
information, he or she must have derived some pecuniary benefit
from such disclosure. 9 An argument can be made that an analyst
whose compensation was tied to investment banking activities
necessarily derived a financial benefit from the use of material,
non-public information gleaned while wearing an analyst's hat for
that firm.
Whatever the theory, the fallout from the anomalous market
conditions created by the Internet is far from over, but in relation
to analysts, the point may be moot. According to one
commentator, as a result of the Internet stock fiasco and
Regulation FD, analysts have lost much of their power, credibility,
and usefulness.'
56. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2001). "The Regulation
[FD] prohibits a company, or persons acting on such company's behalf, from
selectively disclosing material inside information regarding such company or its
securities." Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and Prompt
Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L Ec. L. 635, 650 (2001).
57. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 659 (1983) (outlining the value in the analysts'
relationship with company insiders in evaluating and providing information
through recommendations).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 663.
60. Kessler, supra note 8 (succinctly stating: "Say goodbye to analysts. The
[SEC's] Regulation Full Disclosure has already wiped out much of their
value .... ). He further predicted, "the [SEC] is only one or two regulations
away from completely neutering the analyst trade." Id. Further trouble is bound
to follow on the heels of the Enron fiasco, yet another instance of industry
experts ignoring the writing on the wall. Id. Analysts from Goldman Sachs,
Merrill, Lynch Pearce Fenner & Smith, UBS Warburg LLC, and Credit Suisse
First Boston rated the stock a buy even after an announcement of the
termination of a limited partnership whose import made a billion dollar
institutional investor "shudder." Id. Analysts for Lehman Brothers Holdings,
Inc. maintained a strong buy rating on Enron and recommended purchasing it
"aggressively." Id. These ratings came on the heels of "inflated business
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet and technology stock phenomenon was clearly an
anomaly.6 The losses for which accountability was sought in these
cases were created by several unique ingredients that are unlikely
to be replicated: a market sector that is not based on traditional
and tangible ideas and methods of valuation; a veritable market
frenzy, where investors were in a rush to snap up all things
Internet, regardless of their actual value; investors' expectation of,
and sense of entitlement to, exponential returns with no downturn;
the unprecedented media exposure and celebrity bestowed on
Internet stock analysts; and the impact a premature negative
recommendation by an analyst could have on this house of cards.
The resulting and unprecedented trust placed on analysts and the
religiosity with which their recommendations were followed are
not likely to continue.
Perhaps the fact that Judge Pollack was loathe to put the
"opinions and economic philosophies"62  of "newspapers,
magazines, and social engineers"" on trial is a direct result of the
convergence of these factors, as well as the extreme unlikelihood of
their simultaneous recurrence. Further, his description of the
Internet and technology market investors as "gamblers in the
world's gaming pits"' sends a clear message. According to Judge
Pollack, if the investors who lost money by listening to Meeker's
recommendations "don't owe her any of their profits... [they can't
expect] her to take their losses."6
While many small investors learned a painful lesson, the
requirements of Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5), heightened by
valuations," "large insider stock sales," and the resignation of Enron's CEO after
only six months on the job, in addition to the limited partnership announcement.
Id.
61. Andreas Rueda refers to it as "one of the most remarkable speculative
bubbles in recent memory." Rueda, supra note 5, at 21.
62. Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No. 01-CIV-7071, 2001
WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Jebsen, supra note 26.
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the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act will not be interpreted
loosely to sustain a cause of action based on analyst liability, absent
a strong showing of intent to defraud. SEC regulations
(particularly Regulation FD), Congressional scrutiny, and investor
skepticism will most likely cause analyst recommendations to
become useless and ignored. In the meantime, the market has in
effect righted the wrongs created by the Internet stock
phenomenon.66
66. Amazon.com, although suffering from a significantly devalued stock price
and trading at $12.61 per share as of January 22, 2002, was recently able to turn a
profit for the first time in the company's history. See Larry Dignan, Amazon
Posts Its First Net Profit, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 22, 2002, available at
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-81968 8.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2002); see also
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing how Amazon.corn once
traded as high as $400 per share). Ironically, the penny per share net profit,
determined in line with general accounting principals, was "well ahead of
analyst's expectations." See Dignan, supra note 67.
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